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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a complete discussion and documentation of the M.I.T.
World Oil Project Aggregate Supply Model. First, the theoretical
development and methodology are presented. The relationships between
geologic and economic characteristics are analyzed and a system of
equations representing the inertial process model are derived.
Next, the construction of the data is described and the data, by country
segment, is presented in detail. Methods of bridging the many gaps in
the data are discussed.
Finally, the simulation forecasts of the model are presented through 1990.
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31. Aggregate Supply Model
The objective of the model developed here is to forecast crude oil
production capacity by geographical area. The forecasting method is
based on projections of development rig activity and analysis of returns
to drilling. Returns calculated as proved reserves-added are superior in
theory, and we discuss them first; but in almost every case we will need
to use the second-best method: wells drilled per rig-year and productive
capacity per well.
1.1 Analysis of Reserve Additions
As used by the American Petroleum Institute (API) the concept of
proved reservesl has a definite economic meaning: a highly accurate
forecast of what will be produced from wells and facilities already
installed. Since variable costs are normally only a small part of the
total, it would take an unusually severe price drop or cost increase to
abort much production from proved reserves.
Given an estimate of current proved reserves, we must next develop a
method for forecasting changes in this quantity. We consider gross
additions to proved reserves in any year as an output, and rig-years as a
proxy or indicator of investment (capital) input which generates these
reserves. Let Rt be proved reserves in an area at the end of year t; Qt
be the area's crude oil production; and RYt be the available number of
operating rig years. The reserves-added per rig-time unit, RA, are
calculated as:
Outside the U.S., published "proved reserve" estimates generally
include a substantial element of what the API calls "indicated additional
reserves from known reservoirs," and also some "probable reserves." See
Adelman-Jacoby (2), p. 34, and Adelman-Houghton-Kaufman-Zimmerman (1),
Chapters 1 and 2, for a more detailed discussion and an example of
aborted reserves.
475 75
RA = (R75 -R 72 + Qt)/( RYt) (1)
t=73 t=73
where 1973-1975 is assumed to be a reasonable base period for
estimation. (More recent data are substituted as they become
available.) The numerator in (1) is gross additions to proved reserves
over the 3-year period, end-1972 to end-1975, where additions include
proved new-field discoveries, new pool discoveries, and revisions and
extensions of known fields, often from development drilling. The
denominator is the number of rig-years during the same period. Rig-time
is superior to feet drilled because it is a better proxy for investment,
although it is necessary to calculate RA separately for onshore and
offshore areas due to their differences in required fixed investment. We
thus divide the countries analyzed into onshore and offshore. Rig-time
registers all time-related elements, including not only depth but also
time used in moving rigs; interruptions for lack of an essential part or
service or any other reason; unusually difficult drilling conditions, etc.
Equation (1) applied to a subsequent year's drilling rate yields a
forecast of reserve additions:
aRt = (RYt) (RA) (2)
The method is a simple extrapolation of recent (1973-1975) experience,
with only inertia (which is considerable) to justify its use. We
currently use RA, as calculated in (1), as an exogenous constant in the
model. Thus, for example, the effect of higher prices on supply makes
itself felt only by increasing investment, i.e., drilling. A later paper
will endogenize development drilling.
Of course the yield from new investment cannot go on forever,
undiminished by the effects of depletion. Thus we define a depletion
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5coefficient, bt, which builds in a diminishing return to further
drilling. Let Cum Rt encompass all past production plus current proved
reserves in year t. Ultimate recoverable reserves, Ult Rt, are then
Cum Rt plus all future additions to proved reserves (and ultimately,
therefore, to production). Using 1975 as the base year for reserves
data, bt may be defined as:
Cum Rt Cum R
bt = (1- lt )/(1 - t )(3)t 75
The expression for reserve additions, equation (2), is now modified to
take this depletion factor into account:
ARt = (RYt) (RA) (bt) (4)
As new reserves are created by drilling, they are essentially a
transfer from the total pool of ultimate production, Ult Rt, for the
country or area. Obviously our numerator in (3) is designed to be
sensitive to intertemporal reestimations of Ult R, in response both to
new discoveries and to new technologies, etc. Currently we assume
Ult Rt t Ult R75, thus bt falls each year (from an initial value of unity
when t = 1975) so that Rt is less and less each year for a constant
drilling rate. Thus, if cumulative production plus the amount already
impounded into proved reserves at year t were the same as the ultimate
production, then (Cum Rt)/(Ult Rt) in the numerator of Equation (3) would
be unity, bt would therefore be zero, and no amount of drilling could add
anything to proved reserves in (4). The closer the numerator of (3) is
to zero, the smaller is the fraction, and therefore the less is the
return to drilling effort, relative to the 1973-75 showing.2 As
2For a fixed Ult Rt (i.e., no major change in the ultimate
prospect) the "discovery decline" is linear. As Cum Rt goes from Cum
R75 to Ult Rt, bt goes (linearly) from one to zero.
6the ultimate reserve estimates are changed up or down, or if we are
confronted with varying estimates of ultimate reserves, we can substitute
them into Equation (3) and see what difference it makes in our forecast.
For example, if technological development causes an increase in Ult Rt in
some year t > 1975 then bt may be > 1 and RA will capture the increased
return to investment.
Our definition of Ult R includes expected discoveries. Our model
does not now have an explicit exploration and discovery process. This
process is implicitly imbedded in our reserves additions mechanism,
equation (4). Theoretically, RYt in (4) should include only development
rig time. However, data limitations often force us to use total rig
time, which includes exploratory. Offshore rig-years are relatively
easily segregated; onshore, it is often impossible.
The translation of discovered reserves into additional producing
capacity may be constrained by: (a) factor supply limitations; and (b)
government policy. Some more basic limitations are considered in our
decline rate discussion below.
We now have total Rt as available for production in year t. Applying
the "appropriate" decline rate to that reserve base gives us the
production capacity. At this point, we note that the decline rate should
approximate the depletion rate (= Qt/Rt). In the United States and the
North Sea, with the strict definition of proved reserves, this concept is
empirically verified; elsewhere, it is not. The calculated production-
reserve ratio is typically much lower outside of North America, and this
is symptomatic of the overstatement of proved reserves, mentioned earlier.
Note that we have so far not explicitly considered costs and price.
Certainly they are implicit in our calculation of RA and our forecast of
RY.
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71.2 Production Profile of Reserve Additions
We now need to go from proved reserves-added to attainable new
capacity. We may rely again on the inertia of the system, and
base-production forecasts on the historical relation of output to proved
reserves. We show this method first. It may also be possible to analyze
the economic forces underlying observed production behavior, and methods
of doing that are discussed below as well.
Whichever method we use, application of a single depletion rate to a
reserve estimate -- to obtain a production profile -- is a strong
simplification, as Figure 1 shows. In the graph, the solid line labeled
"Production" shows a typical production profile for a field; the area
under the curve is the total proved reserves, R. The dashed "Production"
line is our simplified version of oil exploitation where production jumps
3immediately3 to an initial (and presumed peak) capacity Qp and declines
4
at a constant percentage rate thereafter. Once again, the area under
the curve is R, so that:
T
C _ e-atR = Qp e atdt . (5) v
t=O
As T *, R Qp/a; or in the limit, a = Qp/R. The question for v
analysis then is: what is the value of the depletion rate, a (and
therefore of Qp), that is appropriate for new additions to reserves? v
Once a is determined it is a simple step to forecasts of supply, as then
3The equating of capacity with production is realistic for
price-takers, but for the cartel it assumes that those nations are not
forced to hold excess capacity in order to help support the price.
4Later we discuss a method of lags in this buildup to Qp which
gives us a closer approximation to the actual profile.
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Figure 1: True and Collapsed Capital
9Qt = aRt. The remaining issue is the lag between the point when proved
reserves are "booked" and the point when the new capacity Qp is on line.
In a mature producing area the lag from the former to the latter is
short, but not in a new province, such as Mexico's Reforma. But data on
lag profiles is difficult to obtain. Thus, as a first approximation, for
onshore areas we assume a two-year development lag in which new proved
reserves are producing at 40 percent of their peak capacity in the first
year and the remaining 60 percent is brought on in the second year. For
offshore areas we assume a four-year development lag which brings on the
additional capacity in 25 percent increments in each of the four years.
The "Expenditure" lines on the graph in Figure 1 illustrate our
required assumption as to capital investment. The solid "Expenditure"
line represents the usual path of expenditures to produce the true (solid
line) "Production" path. But in order to conform to our model hypothesis
that Qp begins immediately, we collapse all capital expenditures to the
same point in time as the dashed "Expenditure" line on the graph. The
implications of this assumption will be discussed in our net present
value analysis later.
1.3 Estimation of Additional Productive apacity
As a first approximation, capacity plans can be calculated on the
assumption that new additions to proved reserves will be depleted at the
same rate as existing fields. Under the assumption of a uniform policy
regarding depletion, the depletion rate for an area can be calculated as
a simple arithmetic average:
1975
a -3 Qt/Rt (6) v
t=1973
ur·-**CnaLI-·-·--·--· ----- -- - ---
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where 1973-75 is again taken as a reasonable base period for estimation.
Then for any new addition to proved reserves in year t, the new installed
capacity is:
aQpt = aaRt · (7)AQ~aA R (7)
Assuming no excess capacity is installed, production from Rt begins at
the level Qt = Qpt and declines at "a" percent per year. But the
calculation of Rt used in (7) is no simple task. Using the method of
Equation (1) requires data on the changes in proved reserves. Usually
these data are too inaccurate for use, thus the results are untenable and
we do not report them here. An alternative is to take the difference in
production between year t and (t - j) and add it to the estimated loss of
productive capacity (cumulative decline) from j to t. This would be a
direct calculation of Qpt in (7). This requires the accurate
measurement of the decline rate, which we do not have except in the U.S.
Moreover, wherever there is irregular fluctuation in output, or any
appreciable amount of excess capacity, the method cannot be used at all,
since change in output is no indication of change in capacity.
A second method is the following. From published data we can
calculate the average well productivity of an area as:
average flow rate per well = Qt/Wt (8)
where Wt is the number of producing oil wells in a given area in year t.
We can also calculate the number of newly drilled wells, Wt, and the
rig-time needed to drill a producing oil well as:
rig-time per well = aWt/RYt (9)
Using 1975 as our general base year, we can estimate the new capacity in
an area for period t from our forecast of development rig-time in period
t as:
111_( 
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aW75 Q75
Qt = RYt (R75) 75 (10)
We term this method the "Average Flow Rate Method." Equation (10) thus
gives us an alternative to (7) for an estimate of Qt.
However, this average flow rate method tends to understate capacity
increments to the extent that new wells are always drilled with better
knowledge of the reservoirs than old wells, and to overstate increments
because one would expect lower well productivities because of well
interference and decline, and as lower-quality strata and reservoirs are
developed. Perhaps even more important, an average for any area may
include low-output fields where there is little drilling because it is
not worthwhile. Thus, to the maximum extent possible, one should
segregate Rt,a and therefore Qt by separate fields, or areas.
We approximate this desired segregation by our third method of
estimating capacity changes, the "Weighted Average Flow Rate Method,"
where we substitute a field-weighted flow rate per well for the average
flow rate used in Equation (10) above. Our estimate of the weighted
average flow rate per well for each area is calculated as follows:
m Q
estimated weighted average flow rate = 2 (i) (ii) (11) v
i=1
where m is the number of major fields (a major field is defined as one
which accounts for at least 3 percent of the country's total production),
Qi is the production of major field i, QM is the total production of
all major fields, i.e.,
m
QM Qi' and Wi is the number of producing wells in major field i. V
i=1
n--u- - -- -- --I-
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Thus QMM is our weighting factor and £ 'I) = 1.
i=l (M
We can substitute from (11) into (10) to get:
aW75 m Qi Qi
aQt = RYt ( ( E ) ( )) (12)
75 i=1 Q i
where (10) is the (simple arithmetic) average flow rate method and (12)
is the weighted average flow rate method. Depending on which of these
methods is chosen, capacity in area i is thus: Qt + aQt where Qt is
corrected for the decline effect from Qt-l' Some independent estimates
of capacity are available for recent years for OPEC countries and can
thus be used as a crosscheck. A comparison of the average and weighted
average methods follows.
1.4 Historical Production-Reserve Ratio
The observed production-reserve ratio for any country is based on an
aggregate of many fields. Hence, for reasons already examined, a simple
division of national production by national reserves may be seriously
misleading. A good example is Table 1, showing Abu Dhabi. Total
national production was 1.7 percent of proved-plus-probable reserves.
But the bulk of those "reserves" is still undeveloped; the true working
inventory is being drawn down much faster. The simple quotient Q/R = .08
gives equal weight to every barrel of developed reserves. But our true
objective is to give equal weight to every barrel produced. If we want
to estimate how much Abu Dhabi is capable of producing next year, the Bu
Hasa field (156 million barrels) is approximately twice as important as
Zakum (82 million).
____ I.----·-·-nBI-LII
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Accordingly, we weight the production-reserve ratio for each field by
its share of total country production (as per equation (11)). This
calculation is shown in Table 1. Use of the weighted average lets us
escape from some of the ill effects of poorly estimated reserves as
well. Since it is a better predictor of future production, it yields
more accurate cost data, which depend on our estimated production profile
(Figure 1). We have, of course, a minor sampling problem since we are
using the average of the listed fields as a proxy for the whole country.
However, the finite population multiplier is a powerful ally; since we
have accounted for 77 percent of the national total of production
(394/512), the error cannot be great.
The weighted mean is a more reliable indicator of cost and it forces
us to look at the several fields to see their capabilities for
expansion. An abnormally low (Qi/Ri) may indicate overstated proved
reserves in that more investment will be needed to drain the number of
indicated barrels. Or it may signal an underdeveloped field.
A little reflection on the meaning of a "field" as a collection of
adjacent or overlapping reservoirs, and the usual development pattern of
going from one to another pool or horizon, will show that the correction
among fields must, to at least a modest degree, also apply within
fields. Hence, even the weighted mean must involve some understatement
of the true depletion rate.
It is likely that outside the United States and Canada, reserves are
overstated and therefore decline rates understated. This is not because
of errors of optimism, but because undeveloped reservoirs in known fields
tend to be counted in.
Beginning with 1978, IPE no longer presents estimates of reserves in
the largest fields. It will be necessary to close the gap in the sources.
I . . -
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Table_ _ Weighted Mean Depletion Rate, Abu Dhabi, 1975
(millions of barrels)
Major Field,
Discovery Date
Asab, 1965
Bu Hasa, 1962
Mubarras, 1971
Um Shaif, 1958
Zakum, 1964
Subtotal
Total Abu Dhabi Fields
Prod ucti on
Q
90
156
7
59
82
394
512
Reserves
R
500
1,289
150
1,706
1,314
4,959
29,500
Unweighted Mean, total Abu Dhabi = 1.7 percent
Unweighted Mean, Large Fields only = 8.0 percent
Weighted Mean, Large Fields only =
[Qi(Qi/Ri)]/'QM = 42.6/394 = 10.8 percent
l ~ M
Sources: Unweighted Mean, OGJ; others, IPE.
Q2/R
16.2
18.9
0.3
2.1
5.1
42.6
Q/R
.180
.121
.047
.035
.062
.080
.017
_ ___ _U_ __I_ _
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1.5 Optimal Depletion Rate
The value of "a" observed in historical data, and calculated by
Equation (6), is the result of a particular set of past conditions of
costs, prices, and taxes. It may or may not be an appropriate guide to
future behavior under different conditions, and therefore we should like
to be able to calculate this parameter more exactly. In theory, we can
do this by assuming profit-maximizing behavior on the part of oil
operators, and solving for the optimal depletion rate, a*, based on
estimates of cost per barrel and future price.
First, it is assumed that the profile of capital expenditures shown
in the graph of Figure 1 can be collapsed to a single-period outlay I.
Data on operating costs are rather sketchy; fortunately the bulk of costs
is usually capital outlay, and this can be approximated by an adjustment
to I, as shown below. We also assume that the capital coefficient,
I/Qp is a constant; later we consider the effects of a capital
coefficient which is higher at higher depletion rates.
By our simplified model of depletion, annual production is
Qt Qpe-at. Let I(Qp) be the capital expenditures required (as a rising
function of the level of initial peak production) to establish production
level Qp. Given a constant expected future oil price, P, and discount
rate, r, the net present value of a block of reserves becomes:
T
NPV =[PQp e-(a r)tdt]- I (13) v
t=O
Letting T *+ we may write (13) as:
PQpNPV a+ r - I (13a)
·2·-rar·l- ---
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Qp is the choice variable and to maximize NPV in (13a) we set
a(NPV)/aQp = O, which gives the necessary first-order condition for
maximizing the value of the reserves. That first-order condition can then
be solved for the optimal decline rate, a*, as:
1/2
a* = 
- r (14)
3Q
where we now explicitly consider price per barrel, P, and marginal
capital costs, aI/aQ. Thus the optimal depletion rate is a function of
the capital coefficient (or, more properly, its reciprocal), the oil
price, and the discount rate. If we consider the project as a whole,
then aI/aQ = I/Q.
With no constraints on the decline rate, we can now solve for the
optimal production capacity in year t as:
Qt = (a*)(Rt). (15)
In any given reservoir, production must some day cease because the
total variable costs tend to be constant per well or grouping of wells
and therefore variables costs per unit must in time rise with declining
output to where they exceed the value of the output. Hence the depletion
rate a = Qt/Rt must increase; in its last year, Qt = Rt and the rate is
unity. For a group of reservoirs the observed a is biased upward; hence
if the decline rate approximates the true depletion rate, the observed a
tends to overstate it. The longer the life of the field, the less
important the bias; generally speaking, it becomes negligible for
reservoirs operating over 25 years ([1]), Ch. 2, Appendix).
Before proceeding to estimate values of I/Qp and a*, it is worthwhile
to question the accuracy of the simplified or "collapsed" model of oil
__ __1_111
_____ ________________I_ 
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exploitation shown in Figure 1. We have reduced a complex process to
only three parameters-total proved reserves, total (or incremental)
investment, and peak or initial output--and we need to make sure that
this model yields a reasonable approximation to reality in view of the
wide variations in production profiles among fields, and the dependence
of the results on the discount rate assumed.
We can get a rough check on this issue by comparing the average
per-barrel cost of oil as calculated by our "collapsed" model against
actual data on expenditure and production profiles for the North Sea.
Referring to Figure 1, we can define an oil price, C, which would meet
the condition
T T
NPV = Et e rtdt - ( CQt e- rtdt = 16)
t=O t=O
where Et is investment expenditures in period t. This C is the supply
price of oil from the reserves illustrated in Figure 1. Or, more
usefully for our purposes, C may be referred to as the average cost per
barrel of oil from a new project in the area shown. We are able to
calculate the "true" value of average per-barrel cost from
Wood-MacKenzie's detailed data for seventeen North Sea fields.
Similarly, by setting NPV = 0 in Equation (13), inserting equivalent
values of the "collapsed" parameters, and solving for P, we can calc late
a comparable set of figures for the simplified model. When we estimate
C = o + a1P using the values of C and P thus calculated, the results are
as follows:
. .. I --
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Table 2. North Sea Cost Estimation
Discount
Rate, r (O al R2 SE CV
10 -.028 (-0.19) 0.972 (16.5) .95 .177 .078
12 -.033 (-0.18) 0.989 (14.4) .93 .224 .089
15 -.046 (-0.18) 1.013 (12.0) .91 .310 .107
20 -.055 (-0.13) 1.067 ( 9.5) .86 .487 .133
(Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, SE = standard error of
regression, CV = coefficient of variation. Source of data: Wood,
MacKenzie and Company, Section 2 of the North Sea Service, February 1976.)
For example, in Table 2, with a 12 percent discount rate, the
"collapsed" unit cost, C, is a little higher on the average than the true
cost: to get from "collapsed" to true, one multiplies collapsed by 0.989
and subtracts 3.3 cents. Thus estimated, the calculated cost differs by
less than 9 percent of the true cost in two-thirds of all cases.
Whatever the discount rate, however, the collapsed cost is a reasonable
approximation to the true cost. But this good fit depends critically oni
the strict definition of reserves as "planned cumulative output from
planned facilities," as discussed above.
Two very general qualifications must be made at this point, First,
Bradley [7] has pointed out that the marginal cost increases essentially
as the square of the depletion rate. Therefore, in the neighborhoo of
optimal depletion much is saved by slightly lower rates of output. The
reduction in net present value is disproportionately small compared with
the reduction in the rate of output. In Table 3 below we consider two
hypothetical projects: one high-cost deposit with $7,300 per barrel of
initial daily output and operating cost of 1 per barrel; and one very
---'- Il---------ii--`^^ LIIDUR----- 1II---·
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low cost deposit, with $365 per initial daily barrel and 25 cents per
barrel operating cost. The high cost deposit has a net present value of
$30 at the optimal depletion rate, of 25 at 50 percent of the optimal
rate, and 18.40 at one-fourth of optimal. The decline of net present
value of the low cost deposit is even more gradual.5
This relation of NPV to depletion should be considered with the
increasing investment requirements per unit of output as one goes to
higher depletion rates, discussed below, and with the pervasive
uncertainty regarding the characteristics of any reservoir. Since the
correct discount rate and cash flow distributions are very difficult to
ascertain, this trade-off of NPV for considerably lower investment and
output might be an acceptable proxy for risk and risk-reduction.
Particularly in a newly developing area, even with no other constraints,
we might expect to see the actual depletion rate be a minor fraction of
the theoretical optimum. Given high risk, the best investment pattern
might be to sacrifice more than half the net present value in order to
reduce the investment and risk exposure by 90 percent, as shown in the
example in Table 3.
Because of these limitations, and particularly in view of the
"Bradley effect" in proxying uncertainty, the usefulness of our
theoretically calculated a* as a guide to normative investment policy is
much reduced. It serves mostly to open questions. That is, if the
operator is without cartel inhibitions, if his reserves are correctly
stated, and if we also have some confidence in the cost estimates, we can
5Parenthetically, the somewhat lower net present value of the lower
cost deposit is achieved with an investment only one-twentieth as great,
and an operating cost only one-fourth as great.
III- -"-l--L- --rr-- -- - ------I
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Table 3: Depletion Rates and Net Present Values (NPV) for
Hypothet- -ical Reservoirs
Oil Price, $/bbl.
Discount rate, pct/year
Investment, $/annual bbl.
Operating cost, $/bbl.
P
r
High Cost
.1
20I
k 1
Theoretically optimal
depletion rate .10
Net Present Value for
a = a*
a =.5a*
a = .25a*
a =.la*
NPV
NPV
NPV
NPV
30.0
25.0
18.4
7.9
Note: As an illustration, suppose both
same proportion, a, as does a*, then
NPV = aPQ -aI - ak
aa* + r r
production and costs vary by the
0<a< 1
aNPV PQr k
(aa* + r) r
Thus, in choosing a, the higher are I and k, the worse the trade-off; the
higher are a and a*, the better; r works both ways.
Low Cost
12
.1
1
.25
.486
17.0
15.7
12.7
7.7
___il__ll__g__r_____lll -- ·C-----·ll_-
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ask why the depletion rate is, say, less than 50 percent of theoretical
optimal, and what kind of nonlinearities, or risks thereof, are being
allowed for.
In both of the examples in Table 3, the discount rate has been taken
as 10 percent. Higher or lower rates would not substantially change the
picture in these examples. However, some reflection on them is
worthwhile if in our modeling work we try to capture greater risk.
In general, a higher interest rate will have two opposing effects on
the optimum depletion rate. Because it makes future use less attractive
compared to present, it will tend to speed up the rate of depletion.
But because it makes production in this capital-intensive industry more
costly today, it tends to slow down the depletion rate. The net result
is not predictable, and a higher interest rate may on balance result in a
slower depletion rate. More often, however, it will likely speed up
depletion.
A higher discount rate is often used as a proxy for greater risk,
and this is proper when it implies a higher yield is necessary before an
investment is to be undertaken. But particularly with the low cost
deposit, it may be irrational for an operator facing a high degree of
political risk or moral hazard to allow for it by using a higher discount
rate which might lead him to speed up the rate of extraction. Instead, a
risk-avoiding profit maximizer may limit sharply the rate of extraction,
thereby avoiding the great bulk of the potential loss (of investment) at
only a very modest penalty in net present value. For now we cannot make
a definitive statement; this problem will be explained formally in a
future paper.
22
As Table 3 suggests, and as shown by differentiating net present
value with respect to the percentage reduction in the depletion rate, the
higher the level of costs, the stronger the reduction in net present
value for any given reduction of the depletion rate. Hence, given high
costs, perhaps in a well-established area, the reduction in depletion
rate will not be nearly as strong as in a low cost and usually newer area.
1.6 Analysis of Capital Costs
1.6.1 Constant Capital Coefficients
Unfortunately, outside the North Sea, we do not have anything
remotely resembling these detailed investment data. Capital coefficients
for differing producing areas can be estimated only very roughly from
historical data. Operating cost data are even more scarce. Indeed, the
lack of cost data is at present as great a gap as the lack of reserve
data.
In addition to this bias, there is also year-to-year inaccuracy
caused by the lumpy nature of much development investment, especially in
lease equipment and loading facilities. The amount invested per unit of
additional daily output will be exaggerated in a year with much work in
process and little completed. Conversely, investment is understated in
the year facilities are completed, and the facilities may begin operating
with little new money being spent.
We have estimated investment requirements per additional daily
barrel. They are presented in Table 4 and are in concept "average cost
at the margin." That is, they are an estimate of what was required, in a
recent time period, to install an additional barrel of daily capacity.
They do not allow for the feedback effect of additional production from
new wells which would cause the capacity of existing wells to decrease.
____I
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Total investment is a product: rig-years multiplied by the average
cost per rig-year. The latter has been derived from U.S. data. It is a
simplified version of the estimates to appear in another working
paper.6 It includes expenditures on drilling, lease equipment,
secondary oil recovery, and overhead. All drilling time is included,
which tends to overstate expenditures because some is exploratory and
some result in gas wells. Injection wells are of course included.
Onshore and offshore have been estimated separately.
New oil production capacity is the product of new oil well
completions in the area multiplied by the weighted average flow rate per
well. Then dividing total investment as determined above by this new
capacity estimate yields the results in Table 4.
Offshore production is usually, but not necessarily, more expensive
since higher cost per well may be more than offset by higher productivity.
The years included were 1974-76, but the estimates have all been
transformed into 1978 dollars by the use of the IPAA cost index. Some of
the estimates are unreliable and implausible because there are too few
observations. For example, the Kuwait number is improbably high (6 well
completions in three years), as is "rest of Europe-offshore" (2
completions) and "Far East and Oceania" (3 completions). "Australia
onshore" might serve as a horrible example: 10.5 rig-years, with one oil
well completion, and an average flow rate of 15 barrels daily, yields a
coefficient over $300,000!
The principal weakness of this kind of estimate is, of course, the
averaging-together of very different areas and formations, with
6Adelman and Ward [5].
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corresponding differences in cost. In any given area, if it is large
enough to be worth the additional study, we can hope to do better,
particularly if oil companies can furnish us more detailed information.
For example, we might try to observe which particular fields were
expanded in a given year, and thereby improve our estimate of new
capacity (the denominator). Or we might be able to allow for unusually
heavy costs in a pressure maintenance program, thus improving our
numerator. For lack of such data, the Iran onshore is surely too low.
The Saudi Arabia onshore is also too low, for lack of allowance for the
Ghawar waterflood project. However, the recent highly publicized
estimates by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee have
exaggerated the costs of that project by a factor somewhere between five
and eight. It appears to be due to simple miscopying, whereby the total
outlay, not only on the water injection scheme but also on gas
processing, liquid separation, gas pipelines and oil pipelines, etc. were
all assigned to the water injection project.
Capital coefficient estimates can be used to check on the
calculation of a*. As an example, take a North Sea field where
investment per peak daily barrel is calculated (from Wood-Mackenzie data)
to be $7,300. We will take r as 10 percent.7 The oil price is assumed
7During 1975-76, dollar-denominated Eurobonds had a 9 percent yield,
which we consider as the prime business-risk rate on long-term financing. We
add 1 percent, which is the average premium above the LIBOR (London Inter-Bank
Offered Rate) on secured financing for the North Sea development projects.
Perhaps a better inflation allowance would start from the fact that the
Sterling LIBOR was generally 4 percentage points above the dollar LIBOR in
1975-76 (9.5 and 5.5 percent respectively) before the sterling slide in late
1976. An interesting confirmation of our 10 percent discount rate is in the
LASMO-SCOT "package" rate, in late 1976, which can be shown to approximate 14
percent in Sterling (see the LASMO-SCOT Prospectus, February 1976).
___ 11
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Table 4. Investment
Of Capacity, Various
AFRICA
Algeria
-Onshore 2,780
Egypt
-Onshore
-Offshore
7,440
2,484
Libya
-Onshore 661
Requirement per Additional Dai
Countries, 1974-1976 (in 1978
ly Barrel
dollars)
EUROPE
North Sea (1976-77)
-Offshore
Rest of Europe"
-Onshore
-Offshore
ASIA
China q
6,088**
8,908***
2,359
56,790
N/A
Nigeria
-Onshore*
-Offshore*
Rest of North
Afric a4
-Onshore*
-Offshore*
Rest of Central¢
South Africa s
-Onshore
-Offshore
268
1,337
3,028
1,113
2,348
2,956
MIDDLE EAST
Bahrain
-Onshore 7,342
Iran
-Onshore
-Offshore
173
1,189
Iraq
-Onshore 348
Kuwait
-Onshore*
Saudi Arabia
-Onshore
-Offshore
U.A.E.
-Onshore
-Offshore
844
113
306
161
2,190
U . .S.R.
Rest of Asiat
Onshore
FAR EAST AND OCEANIA
Ma laysia-Brunei
-Offshore
Australi a
-Onshore*
-Offshore
Indonesia
-Onshore
-Offshore
Rest of Far East
and Oceania q
-Onshore*
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Argenthorna
-Onshore
Brazil
-Onshore
-Offshore
Mexico I°
-Reforma
-Other
-Total Onshore
Venezuela
-Onshore
-Offshore+
V
N/A
V
4,198
V
2,384
V
v
376,336
1,625
741
1,594
V
68,470
15,325
7,688
16,823
N/A
N/A
31,631
644
5,974
II
_ ____ __ 
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Table 4 (continued)
Rest of South
Central America
-Onshore 1,447
-Offshore 3,173
NORTH AMERICA
Canada
U.S.A. (lower 48)
Alaska
Notes to Table 4
*Indicates weighted average omits one or more of years due to too few reported
rigyears or well completions these years.
**Excludes costs of transportation to shore.
***Includes costs of transportation to shore.
+Lake Maracaibo.
N/A indicates not available.
Numbered footnotes are in Appendix I.
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to be 12.50 per barrel, and initial operating cost (at peak production)
is $.95 per barrel,8 i.e., 347 per year over the life of the field.
Assuming the typical North Sea field's 20-year life, and a 10 percent
discount rate (estimated as discussed above), a stream of outlays or
receipts of 347 per year is worth approximately (347)(8.65) = 3,000.
Investment plus operating cost now equate to a capital sum of $7,300 +
$3,000 = $10,300. Then:
* /365()12.50) (.10)
a* --- 10 = - .110 (17) 
In fact, outside of Auk and Argyll, observed North Sea Qp/R ratios
(which are an approximation of a*) are about 9 percent. We will see
shortly why they should be expected to be a bit lower than optimal.
As another example, we may take the hypothetical field "discovered"
by Conoco on the Georges Bank (Oil and Gas Journal, July 19, 1976, p.
60). It contains 200 million barrels, to be drained in 15-20 years (say,
17.5) and requires an investment of 397 million. We assume operating
costs will be slightly lower than Montrose and Heather (slightly smaller
fields) in the North Sea, i.e., 25 million annually, over a 17.5 year
period hence with a present value of 207 million; total investment is
then $604 million. Initial output is 60 thousand barrels per day, hence
the total capital coefficient is $10,066 per daily barrel.
Conoco assumes P = 14 per barrel, and hence our estimated a* 12.5
percent. Conoco's estimate is 10.95 percent.
8Wood-MacKenzie report, October 1976, Section Two, Table 1, average
for all proved fields.
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Another comparison is possible, using a paper prepared at the U.S.
Geological Survey ( ). The authors hypothesize a reservoir with a given V
quantity of producible gas, reservoir pressure, price-cost parameters,
and four possible rates of water encroachment. The operator's decision
on number of wells determines the initial Qp, the ratio Qp/R, the
production profile over time, and the NPV of the deposit. Since price,
operating costs, taxes, and the capital coefficient can be approximated
from their data, and the interest rate is given, we can calculate a* =
.135. In fact, the ratio which they calculate would maximize NPV is in
the range between .157 and .173. (Although ultimate recovery is
sensitive to the rate of withdrawal, there is no well interference, and
initial withdrawal is explicitly stated as strictly proportional to the
number of wells drilled.)
Finally, there is a hypothetical Gulf of Alaska field [11, see also
Appendix II], where, on the data given, a* would range from 9.2 to 12.6
percent assuming lower costs, or from 6.4 to 10.4 percent assuming higher
costs. In both cases, the lowest depletion rate is for a 20 percent
discount rate, the highest depletion rate for a 10 percent discount
rate. The actual depletion rate, i.e., peak-year production to total, is
11.7 percent. However, this is not the result of any optimizing
calculation, but only a modal or "typical" plan.
It should not be supposed that depletion or decline rates above 50
percent are bizarre or impossible. It all depends on the particular
reservoir. Miller and Dyes [9] analyzed optimum development in a
hypothetical reservoir where the operator was free to, and did, seek
maximum net worth. The reservoir contained ten million barrels in
place. With a solution gas drive, 1.8 million barrels would be
____II _IY -1_____---I1_ -1_^-111 ^1 1---_11111
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recovered; under a complete water drive, 4.1 million. In each case,
present value changes very little in the neighborhood of the optimum
number of wells, e.g., for solution gas drive it decreases approximately
14 percent for two wells, as compared with four wells. Decline rates
were respectively 66 percent and 78 percent.
1.6.2 Variable Capital Coefficients. So far, it would appear that
a* gives values not too far out of line with reality. But the three
validation examples have been very high-cost areas. In low-cost areas,
we must expect depletion rates to be generally below computed a*. This
is to be expected for various reasons:
1. Published "reserves" may greatly exceed true proved reserves,
i.e., planned cumulative output through existing installations, even
when labeled "proved."
2. Risk avoidance because of the "Bradley effect" (discussed above).
3. The operator may be inhibited by a fear of spoiling the market,
or by an understanding to keep output down in order to maintain
prices. This is obviously the case with the core cartel countries.
4. The most important reason is that marginal investment
requirements per barrel of additional capacity, or operating costs
per additional barrel, may go considerably above the average as
calculated in Table 4.
At low depletion rates, investment requirements may decline as
indivisibilities are spread thinner: access roads, supply dumps, etc.
But at a fairly early stage these scale economies tend to become
insignificant. Thereafter, there may be an interval, short or long, over
which investment and operating cost requirements are relatively flat for
the whole hydrodynamic system is involved: the oil in place (including
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dissolved gas), any associated gas, and water. The volume and pressure
of the hydrocarbon may be a minor or very tiny fraction of the whole.
But usually, past some point, the higher the total output, the lower the
output per well. Hence, there is a margin where the output gained by
drilling a well declines, perhaps sharply. And at some farther point the
increase in output per additional well may become extremely nonlinear,
even negative. Too high a rate of output may cause gas to come out of
solution, or water to break through to the well bore ahead of the oil, in
which case output per well may be considerably decreased or cease
altogether, and ultimate recovery may be much reduced. Thus the cost of
an increment from Qn to Qn+1 may be much greater than from Qn-1 to Qn'
In the United States, where reserves are estimated strictly on a very
large sample of reservoirs, since 1972 there have been no restrictions on
output. Despite incentives to speed recovery, the ratio of production to
proved reserves has been very stable in the neighborhood of 11.8
percent. It is expected to remain there, and production out of proved
reserves to decline at that rate ((5), p. 214). Smaller areas are as low
as 9.0 (California, San Joaquin basin) or as high as 24.6 percent (Texas,
District 5)(5), (Table I).
In a mature producing area, the mean depletion rate must exceed the
ratio Qp/R. (At the extreme, imagine a reservoir which will close down a
year from today. The ratio today is then unity.) In an area where
reserves are actually declining, the bias is more pronounced. During the
last years of near-universal stability of reserves in the United States,
1959-61, the mean percentage was respectively 7.82, 7.82, and 7.86 [6,
Table II]. A new reservoir would have had a lower Qp/R. In more recent
years, new reservoirs may not have had any higher ratios.
11 -- -__I___.1_ -.1______~~
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The United States also provides us with a good example of a very
large recently opened field, Prudhoe Bay in Alaska. In early 1980, its
optimal capacity was put at 1.5 million barrels daily, and reserves of
8435 million barrels [11]. Thus the optimal 1980 depletion rate was 6.7
percent. In a developed field, the traditional suitable rate is 6.7
percent (i.e., reserves 15 times output). If, therefore, the U.S.
average is nearly twice as high, this is a bias of observation. We
should expect new fields in California (San Jaoquin) to be well below 9
percent; in Texas (District 5) well below 25 percent. This gives us an
idea of the limits imposed by reservoir behavior, which raise (aI/aQ),
hence constrain a*. Therefore we might reckon that in most fields the
ceiling to depletion rates must be in the low teens.
To make I, the investment, an increasing function of Qp/R, James L.
Smith has devised the following approach. We specify the reservoir
investment function as:
I = KacR (18)
with K the proportionality constant and (epsilon) the elasticity of
investment with respect to the depletion rate. Since aR = Qp, varying
e in a R will vary the investment as a function of chosen output (i.e.,
the depletion rate). The constant K merely translates planned initial
output into dollar requirements. Thus e = 1 implies constant (linear)
costs; > 1 implies increasing costs, etc.
The equivalent of Equation (13) is:
P Q
NPV= a P - Ka£R (19)
and the optimal initial depletion rate can be expressed in the following
relation:
-81·llpllarrrrrr·rr* -- .-^----rBr-. ' ----------
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a* r= r (20)
EK(a*)-1
Note that equation (14) is just a special case of (20), where e = 1 and
therefore K = I/Qp. The a* in Equation (14) implied that well
productivity had not yet entered the phase of diminishing returns. But
Equation (20) now lets us obtain a marginal cost which allows for the
increasing costs imposed by well interference or by any other cause of
diminishing returns; and to derive an optimal initial producing rate
accordingly.
With an estimate of £, we have all the parameters needed to solve for
a*, with the exception of the constant K. By Equation (18) we can state
K as a function of I/Qp and a, and we have the historical value of the
capital coefficient, and the depletion rate , which are proxiesca ital ffi i t, I/QpI  th  l tion ,
for the true values. Thus:
K = :I Qp)a (18a)
With K as estimated by (18a), we can solve Equation (20) (we use an
iterative algorithm that permits a numerical approximation) for the
optimal future depletion rate a*.
Table 5 shows some of the results, assuming the historical depletion
rate was 0.1, P = 10.50, and r = .12. The reason why we need this
procedure is not far to seek. The range of observed capital coefficients
is enormous. The top line of Table 5, which puts the interference effect
to zero (i.e., £ = 1), would indicate that with particularly low capital
requirements (300 per initial daily barrel) the oil should be brought
out in less than a year. But: (1) it is probably physically impossible
_ ____1_ ___1_________1__1_________ll________·
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Table 5. Optimal Depletion Rate (a*) for Various Parameter Assumptions
Table 5a. For a = 0.1, P = $10.50, r = .12
Elasticity f torfCa-TTpitaT Coeficient (Ip)
$300 g8Uu
1.12
0.74
0.54
0.35
0.21
U .64
0.44
0.34
0.23
0.16
-I-----rr--~- -- -- ·- IrPI--- - -I__~~
g1buu
---0.43
0.31
0.24
0.18
0.13
Table 5b. For a= 0.1, P = 20.00, r = .12
Elasticity Historical Capital Coefficient (/P)
WJUU b15oU
1 . 0 - -- --- -. 64 0.21
1.25 1.02 0.62 0.45 0.16
1.5 0.73 0.46 0.34 0.13
2.0 0.45 0.30 0.23 0.11
3.0 0.26 0.19 0.16 0.09
A
Table 5c. For a = 0.1, P = $30.00, r = .12
A 
Elasticity Historical Capital Coefficient (I/Qp)
(~) ~~ -300 :800 __500- 8000
1.U o - .7. 16 0.82 0.29
1.25 1.25 0.77 0.56 0.21
1.5 0.87 0.56 0.42 0.17
2.0 0.53 0. 36 0.28 0.13
3.0 0.29 0.22 0.18 0.10
Table 5d. For a = 0.1, P = $40.00, r = .12
Elasticity ----- a--C-- Hi i c ient ( I/Qp)
(TV7 c-8ssr- ) - 8-- -- - % -$0 1500 $8000
1.0
1.25
1.5
2.0
3.0
2.30
1.43
0.99
0.59
0.32
1.36
0.89
0.64
0.40
0.24
0.96
0.65
0.48
0.31
0.20
0.35
0. 25
0.20
0.15
0.12
N.B.: a = historical depletion rate
P = price
r = discount rate
1.0
1.25
1.5
2.0
3.0
~8uu
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.08
0.07
4
I-
~80UU
b,
I'
V
U,
I - - - - F-~~~_ 
-I-- -- ----- --- "~ 
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to drill and complete the well and equipment so quickly; (2) The
draw-down could not be sustained; the attempt would damage the reservoir
and lose reserves; (3) The attempt to install so much capacity so quickly
A A
would drive the value of K far above the historical value of I/Q; and,
(4) So high a rate of initial output would reduce output per well, again
raising the value of K above past observed values.
Hence the use of e and the algorithm of Table 5 is to isolate cases
where neither (1) nor (2) governs, and to put at least some subjective
value on the effect of (3) or (4) or both.
A final qualification: an expectation of higher prices would,
ceteris paribus, justify delaying output and thus lower a*. This is a
problem in optimal control theory, and we intend to work out the
functional relation in a later paper.
1.7 An Example -- Mexico Reforma
The aggregated method herein described, with national entities as
building blocks, treats as one reservoir what may be a collection of
hundreds. Small countries may be left that way. But larger ones must,
as soon as possible, be divided into rational subgroups. In every case,
we divide between onshore and offshore. We can illustrate our method
using the important new Reforma area of Mexico.9 In this region, the new
reserves-proved, probable and ultimate--have all been added since 1972,
and therefore we treat the area separately from the rest of Mexico. To
9The Mexican authorities use a definition of proved reserves which
is very close to the strict API concept: "reserves which are expected to
be produced by existing wells through primary and secondary recovery;"
from Prospectus, Mexico External Bonds Due 1983 p. 17, (September
1976).- At a later stage, the definition may have been relaxed; but our
data relate to the earlier unambiguous period.
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apply to the newly developing areas the coefficients derived from areas
50 to 75 years old would have been right only by chance.
In Table 6, we set out the number of development rigs operating in
the Reforma area. We assume, provisionally, that the number stays
constant at the level reached in March 1979, in order to examine the
consequences. In column 2, we show the number of wells operating, and in
column 3, the output (including a small amount of natural gas liquids).
Diminishing returns are shown by the bt coefficient, and amount to 8
percent per year by 1985. Were we to use a higher estimate of ultimate
reserves than 55 billion, the decline would be less. The coefficient is
set at unity for 1976, on the theory that the area was too little
developed until that time to make it worth calculating, and to start the
simulation at 1977.
By comparing the increase in the number of wells with the number of
rigs, one sees the number of wells dug per rig year. For 1973-76
inclusive the average (or strictly speaking the coefficient in a
regression) was only .642 wells per rig year, or 18.75 months to drill a
well of 14,000 feet. This is an unusually slow rate, and should perhaps
be ascribed to the problems of opening a new area.
Had we no other information, we should have overridden this drilling
rate on the basis of information from other sources. Fortunately, we had
a far better means of correction, from a Pemex document, which gave the
complete drilling plan for 1978. It showed an average of 5.53 rig months
per well which we rounded up to 6.0 rig months. The same document showed
an average allowance of two months for moving a rig from one site to the
next, for a total of 8.0 rig months per well, or 1.5 wells per rig-year.
We lowered to 1.2 on the theory of one-fifth slippage as the number of
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Table 6. Calculation of Production in Reforma Fields, Mexico
Assumptions: Proved Reserves are 55 BB end-1978; initial output per
well is 5500 bpd.
Development Wells
Year Rigs Operating
19 /
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
(4) (5)
bt Forecast
Coeff icient Output
(tbd)
45
44
44
45.4
58.5
90o
90
90
90
90
90
90
109
142
250
358
466
574
682
790
898
1.0
.813
587
760
1379
1936
2465
2944
3369
3731
4023
a90 rigs in March 1979.
bFirst six months average, OGJ, Dec. 26, 1977.
Source: Adelman and Owsley [3].
- -(6)
Actual
Output
(tbd)
U
113
288
432
600
865
1117
CrCTIU - --- · -- -'------L----- --- ------- ·------ --- j+----------
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rigs built up so sharply. This number was applied to column 1, to obtain
annual additions to the total shown in column 2. Output is estimated by
starting with 5531 barrels daily per well in 1979, then declining to 4480
with the bt coefficient, as explained.
Early in 1978 it was announced that a figure of 2.25 million barrels
daily for Mexico (hence about 1.81 for Reforma) would be attained in
1980, not 1982. This makes our simulation too high by 130 tbd, about 7
percent. On the other hand the chief of development for Pemex said, in
May 1978, that production could be increased by 500 tbd throughout the
1980s. This confirms that the buildup is too high by 100 tbd and then by
60 tbd in 1979 and 1980, but then decreases too fast; the bt coefficient
is dropping too fast.
If this was correct, the rig buildup in Reforma should be over. The
current ceiling for Reforma production is 2.16 (or 2.5 for all Mexico).
Even with 90 rigs, a target reached in early 1981, it will soon be much
surpassed. Hence we can watch the total of drilling rigs operating there
(and make an estimate of development rigs) as an indication of investment
and production planning. If the rig total is maintained (and especially
if it is increased), we can be reasonably sure that the target has been
revised upward; contrariwise, if the number of rigs diminishes.
As can be seen, the simulation tracks output fairly well, the worst
performance being for 1979, when production was hampered by shutting-in
wells with high gas/oil ratios to avoid flaring. This is the kind of
deflection the model does not capture.
A different kind of deflection is captured only with a time lag. The
offshore wells have proved to be the most productive in the world,
38
averaging about 40,000 barrels daily [14]. They constitute, in effect, a
second Reforma, and the model will need to be further divided.
1.8 The Influence of Taxes on the Depletion Rate
Taxation may lower the optimal output rate. Looking again at the
North Sea example and assuming output to have been pushed to where
e = 1.0, NPV is maximized by depleting at 11 percent per annum. From
Equations (13,17) and the data in our previous North Sea example, we can
calculate the internal rate of return r'. That is, if NPV = 0 in
Equation (13), then
P QP
a + r =I (21)
and in this North Sea case 4,562/(.11 + r') = 10,770 and thus r' 
0.34. (With the price at 30, r' = 0.91.)
The objective of the government is to capture as much as possible of
the difference between a return of 34 percent, and the operator's minimum
acceptable return of, say, 10 percent, which is how we define the bare
cost of production. But royalty or excise payments may make the operator
change his plans, to make everybody worse off. For example, if they
simply took a 50 percent royalty, thus cutting P to 6.25, the operator
would maximize NPV at a* = .05. Thus the investment and the peak output
would be only 5/11 of optimal. It is not worth the operator's while to
spend more money to get the oil out faster, though he will get it out
eventually.10 The total NPV per barrel is less:
NPV/Q = ((5/11)(365 x 12.50)/.15) - $10,770 = $3,056
10Note that one barrel per day, declining at 10 percent, cumulates
to 9.09 barrels of original reserves. If we produce only (5/11) of a
barrel, declining at 5 percent, this too cumulates to 9.09 barrels.
_CI _ 
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This is only about 45 percent of the optimal NPV.
The operator's return is now:
$10,770 + ($6.25(365)5/11) 0$10, 770 ~L .05 + r'
r' = .10 - .05 = .05
which is of course unacceptably low, and the government must prepare a
lower royalty. Where costs are very low, the dampening effect of a
royalty or excise does not matter nearly as much. Given a not infrequent
case of poor information and mutual mistrust, one can easily write such a
scenario of deadlock as is being played out in several countries today.
An alternative would be to set NPV as the upper limit to taxation,
and aim to get some maximum practical fraction of it. The chief barrier
is uncertainty. Where there is agreement on the cost and revenue data in
our example, the government could bargain for a lump sum payment of
somewhat less than 11,500, payable in installments at the convenience of
both parties, but independent of the volume of production, so that the
operator would have no incentive to change his plan. Another possibility
would be to calculate total NPV as expected, then to provide a sliding
scale of government take, in order to give the operator an incentive to
reduce costs or increase output.
We may eventually devise some plan, but for the present we need only
note that since governments have not followed it, they must have reduced
the rate of production and NPV below what is attainable. Again, we
follow a simplified approach: translate the tax into a royalty-
equivalent, of the type of Equation (21), and calculate with the
resulting depletion rate. In practice this becomes very complex, because
the usual arrangement is for recovery of costs at an early stage. This
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reduces, often drastically, the present-value equivalent excise, and,
therefore, the impact on NPV.
1.9 Conclusion
Oil costs are almost everywhere only a small fraction of prevailing
prices. Hence even substantial price changes would have little effect on
supply. Moreover, the owners of the resource are governments, with more
than the usual number of degrees of freedom to choose investment and
pricing policies. Hence a model driven by some assumed price-cost-profit
equilibrium will probably not capture the essentials of the supply side
of the market. Furthermore, the basic determinants of cost and supply --
the investment needed to find, delineate, and exploit reservoirs, and the
time for this operation - are so imperfectly known that the need to
respect data limitations has dominated our model. We have perforce
adopted a rough and often ad hoc scheme for predicting the amount of
reserves to be developed, calculating real production costs, predicting
government policy on capturing the profits on incremental investment, and
deciding on the rate of growth of capacity.
-----l--------Ti- `.I-. ---- --- -- ·
41
2. Data
2.1 Production and Reserves
Table 7 presents our data for cumulative production, R75, Cum R75,
and Ult R75 for use in our model. Table 8 shows the capacity added rates
for both the Average Flow Rate Method (column (1)) and the Weighted
Average Flow Rate Method (column (2)). For our model simulation we use
the rig-year rates prevailing as of March 1977 (column (3) in Table 8).
Column (4) in Table 8 shows the constrained a used in the model if a* >
a. The footnotes to Tables 7 and 8 are an integral part of the data and
are contained in Appendix I.
No detailed comments are attempted. Several anomalies are apparent,
and serve to make us re-examine data or assumptions, e.g., the 3 percent
constraint for Saudi Arabia production, or the decline in drilling there;
or the original 1978 capacity, which relates to what the well can
produce, not what the surface facilities can put through.
t
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Table 7. Production and Reserve Data (as of 12-31-75)
(1)
Cumulative
Productionl
(bb)
(2)
Proved
Reserves2
(R75)
(bb)
(3)
Cumulative
Discovered
Reserv es
(1) + (2)
(Cum R7
(bb
(4)
Ultimate
Dis-
coverable
Reserv es3
(U lt R)(bbJ
AFRICA
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Nigeria
- Onshore
- Offshore
Rest of N. Africa+
Rest of Centralt
South Africa!
MIDDLE EAST
Bahrai n
Iran-Onshore
Iran-Off shore
Iraq
Kuwait
Neutral Zone
-Onshore
-Offshore
Saudi Arabia
-Onshore
-Offshore
U .A.E .- Onshore
U.A.E.-Offshore
18.00
13.30
58.10
30.50
19.00
1.10
v
28.80
0.90
126.80
11.10
70.00
90.00
2.20
10.40
195.00
83.60
18.20
64.30
4.03
1.30
9.00
3.30
1.20
0.29
0.85
0.60
21. 00
1.30
10.90
17.00
0.95
1.55
23.90
0.60
3.00
3.40
7.37
3.70
26.10
6.90
2.70
0.80
6.45
0.20
45.20
5.90
26. 00
54.50
1.15
5.25
84.10
33.80
7.50
17.40
11.40
5.00
35.10
10.20
3.90
1.09
7.30
0.80
66.20
7.20
36.90
71.50
2.10
6.80
108.00
34.40
10.50
20.80
'-"I- --- -·111111---)1-
·------------ T 
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Table 7 (conti nued)
(1)
Cumulative
Production
(bb)
(2)
Proved
Reserves2
(R75)
1
(bb)
(3)
Cumulative
Discovered
Rese rv es
(1) + (2)(Cum R7
(b91
(4)
Ultimate
Dis-
coverable
Reserves3
(Ult R)(bbl
Norway
U.K.
Rest of Europe'
ASIA
Ch ina-Onshore'
Chi na-Off shorer
U.S.S.R.
Rest of Asia8
0.10
0.00
3.00
3.10
0.00
N/A
1.20
FAR EAST AND OCEANIA
Australia-Onshore 0.1
-Offshore 0.71
Indonesia
-Onshore 5.91
-Offshore 0.41
Malaysia-Brunei
-Onshore O.9(
-Offshore 0.6(
Rest of Far East
and Oceania9 0.4(
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Argentina 2.5(
Brazil-Onshore 0.8(
Brazil-Offshore 0.1(
0
)
)
)
)0
)
)
)
EUROPE
75.00
41.00
13.30
7.00
16.00
2.50
8.80
1.50
66.89
3.40
0.10
1.60
V
39.51
30.00
V
V
7.10
16.00
5.50
11.90
1.50
N/A
4.60
0.20
2.30
18.60
1.00
0.90
1.60
0.50
3.40
1.20
0.40
600.00
38.30
0.80
7.10
37.80
2.00
2.40
12.40
12.70
0.60
0.00
1.00
0.10 36.60 V
0.90
0.40
0.30
8.40
1.70
1.60
- -------- - ------- -
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Cumulative
Production 1
(bb)
Table 7 (continued)
Proved
Reserves2
(R75)
(bb)
(3)
Cumulative
Discovered
Rese rv es(1) + (2)(Cum R75
(bb
(4)
Ultimate
Dis-
coverable
Rese rv es3
(Ult(R7)(bb
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA (continued)
Mexico-Reforma ° 0.10 6.00
Mex ico-Otherle 4.70 1.30
Venezuela
-Ons hore 17.40 10.90
-Offshore 14.70 4.60
Rest of South and
Central America" 5.10 4.90
NORTH AMERICA
Canada
Crude Oil
NGL*
Tot al
USA (lower 48)
Crude Oil
NGL*
Total
Alaska
Total USA
7.44
0.90
8.30
108.33
15.69
124.02
0.68
124.70
6.65
1.59
8.24
32.70
6.27
38.97
10.00
48.97
*Natural gas
footnote 12).
liquids-data are as of 12/31/74 from API and CPA (see
Numbered footnotes are in Appendix I.
90.00
6.50
V
VY6.106.00
28.30
19.30
10.00
54.60
20.00
25.80 V
14.09
2.49
16 .54
141 .03
21.96
162.99
10.68
17 3.67
65.80
2.73
68.53
218.13
218.13
10.72
228.85
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Table 8. Capacity-Added Per Rig-Year and Total Rig Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Weighted Total Rig Constrained
Flow Rate Average Years at Production
Method Flow Rate March 1977 Rate out of
Method Rate Reserves
(tbd/RY) (tbd/RY) (RY) (Historical
weighted
mean deple-
tion rate)
(percent)
AFRICA
Algeria
Egypt
L i bya
Nigeria-Onshore
Nigeria-Offshore
Rest of North
Afric as
Rest of Central
South Africa'
MIDDLE EAST
Bahrain
Iran-Onshore
Iran-Off shore
Iraq
Kuwait
Neutral Zone
-Onshore
-Offshore
Saudi Arabia
-Onshore
-Offshore
U.A.E.-Onshore
U.A.E.-Offshore
2.1
1.3
11.4
7.2
1.7
0.7
13.5
3.7
2.3
15.3
56.1
0.6
0.1
15.5
2.0
36.9
24.1
22.3
4.0
0.0
6.8
115.0
23.1
48.8
5.1
2.0
55.9
37.6
32.8
4.1
0.0
7.2
129.3
25.5
98.2
5.4
108.00
18.0
21 .0
17.75
21.1
28.9
67.4
1.6
49.0
9.0
25.0
1.0
0.0
3.0
14.3
4.25
10.00
20.00
.09
.09
.06
.08
.07
.13
.05
.13
.05
.04
.09
.09
.02
.02
.03
.02
.11
.06
V
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Table 8 (continued)
Average Weighted
Flow Rate Average
Method Flow Rate
Method F
(tbd/RY) (tbd/RY)
(3)
Total Rig
Years at
March 1977
late
(RY)
(4)
Cons trai ned
Production
Rate out of
Reserves
(Historical
weighted
mean deple-
tion rate)
(percent)
5.0
31.0
Rest of Europe
ASIA
Ch ina-Onshore 
-Offshore7
U.S.S.R.
Rest of Asia 9
0.1
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.2
FAR EAST AND OCEANIA
Australia-Onshore 4.8
-Offshore 1.3
Indonesia-Onshore 3.0
-Offshore 0.8
Malaysi a-Brunei
-Onshore 9.3
-Offshore 0.2
Rest of Far Eastt
Oceania9 0.0
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Argentina 0.5
Brazi l-Onshore 0.4
-Offshore 0.5
EUROPE
Norway
U.K.
0.1 98.0 .06
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.1
0.4
7.5
13.1
0.8
.02 V
N/A
N/A
N/A
92.0
3.0
3.0
46.7
16.0
1.0
11.0
0.8
1.1
.12
.10
.07
.15
.11
.11
1 0.01 .2655.0
73.0
v
0.6
0.6
1.8
24.0
21 .0
17.0
.14
.14
- Ylr 7' 'lr' 
-`'--~-----~- -- -
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Table 8 (continued)
(1) (2)
Average Weighted
Flow Rate Average
Method Flow Rate
Meth od
(tbd/RY) (tbd/RY)
(3)
Total Rig
Years at
March 1977
Rate
(RY)
(4)
Cons trai ned
Production
Rate out of
Reserves
(Historical
weighted
mean deple-
tion rate)
(percent)
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA (continued)
Mex ico-Reforma°
-Other o
Venezuela-Onshore
-Offshore
Rest of South
Central American
NORTH AMERICA
Canada
U.S.A.
Alaska
Numbered footnotes are in Appendix I.
V
.09
.09
.16
.16
14.6
0.7
7.8
0.4
1.3
0.5
0.2
N/A
14.6
0.7
14.3
3.6
8.6
2.7
0.2
N/A
61.0
76.0
9.0
12.0
147 .0
261.0
1,821.0
N/A
.08
V
.08
.11
.11
~'---'----- --- ----------~r  -- ·- r -- _ ~ ~ -
------- --- 
__
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3. Production Capacity Forecasts
The following forecasts are made by the two separate methods:
Table 9 - Average Flow Rate Method (AFR)
Table 10 - Weighted Average Flow Rate Method (WAFR)
Table 11 - Summary of AFR
An approximate validation can be made for 1976, as follows, where
all figures are in mbd. For non-OPEC countries, we assume capacity equal
to production, and use net exports for Communist countries; for OPEC, we
use capacity as estimated by the CIA:
1976 1976 Forecast
Actual AFR WAFR
Africa 6.7 7 .27
Middle East 28.2 29.2 30.0
Europe .9 .5 .5
Communist net 1.8 1.7 1.7
exports
Asia 4 Far East 3.1 2.9 3.0
S $ C America 5.0 4.8 5.3
North America 11.5 11.1 11.3
(incl. 1 mbd NGL)
Tot al 5r. - 5.- 59.5
The forecasts in Tables 9, 10 and 11 assume that the rate of
drilling increases by 5 percent per year. We have made similar forecasts
which assume a constant drilling rate. By way of general comparison, the
forecast capacity figures for the earlier years are somewhat higher when
the drilling rate increases, but fall off in the later years more rapidly
as the effect of the bt coefficient is felt. Many forecast percentage
errors are largely due to data anomalies. For example, for "Rest of
Central and South Africa," Cabinda was shut down shortly after this data
series ended.
_____II__ _______I___ 1_____1 I I--l--L·---
__.__.--I
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Crude Oil
TABLE 9
(plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts*
Average Flow Rate Method (AFR)
(mbd)
by
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
COUNTRY Actual** Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
AFRICA
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Nigeria-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total
Rest of North Africa
Rest of Central
& South Africa
Total Africa
MIDDLE EAST
Bahrain
Iran-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total
Iraq
Kuwait
Neutral Zone-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total
Saudi Arabia-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total
U.A.E.-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total
Total Middle East
1.2
0.5
2.5
N/A
N/A
2.5
0.1
0.5
7.3
0.1
N/A
N/A
7.0
3.4
2.9
N/A
N/A
0.7
N/A
N/A
12.5
N/A
N/A
3.2
29.8
1.3
0.3
2.7
1.8
0.6
2.4
0.1
2.1
8.9
0.1
6.5
0.7
7.2
3.6
2.8
0.2
0.3
0.5
12.2
2.1
14.3
2.7
0.7
3.4
31.9
8
40
8
-4
0
320
22
0
3
6
-3
-29
14
6
7
1.4
0.3
2.8
1.8
0.6
2.4
0.1
2.5
9.5
0.1
6.4
0.8
7.2
4.0
2.4
0.2
0.4
0.6
13.1
2.2
15.3
2.7
0.8
3.5
33.1
1 .3
0.3
3.0
1.8
0.6
2.4
0.0
2.3
9.3
0.0
6.6
0.6
7.2
4.4
1.5
0.1
0.4
0.5
12.8
2.5
15.3
2.0
1.2
3.2
32.1
1.0
0.4
2.9
1.8
0.7
2.5
0.0
1.8
8.6
0.0
6.7
0.5
7.2
4.1
1 .0
0.1
0.4
0.5
11.2
2.7
13.9
1.2
1.5
2.7
29.4
The forecast was made for each year for the period 1976 to 1990. It assumes a 5%
annual increase in development rig years for each country, beginning in 1976.
Figures are rounded to the nearest one hundred thousand barrels per day.
CIA "Installed" capacity is used for OPEC countries. Net exports to the non-communist
world are shown for China and the U.S.S.R. and the "Actual" numbers are for 1977
rather than 1978.
Note: Numbered Footnotes are inAppendix I.
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TABLE 9 (Continued)
Crude Oil (plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts* by
Average Flow Rate Method (AFR)
(mbd)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
COUNTRY Actual* Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
EUROPE
Norway 0.4 0.3 -25 0.5 1.1 1.6
U.K. 1.1 0.3 -72 0.6 1.3 1.7
Rest of Europe 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.2 0.2
Total Europe 1.8 0.9 -50 1.4 2.6 3.5
ASIA
China-Onshore7 N/A 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
-Offshore 7 N/A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-Total 0.2 0.1 -50 0.0 0.0 0.0
U.S.S.R. 8 1.4 1.4 0 2.0 1.0 0.0
Rest of Asia 0.3 0.5 67 0.5 0.6 0.7
Total Asia 1.9 2.0 5 2.5 1.6 0.7
FAR EAST AND OCEANIA
Australia-Onshore N/A 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
-Offshore N/A 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
-Total 0.4 0.4 0 0.4 0.3 0.2
Indonesia-Onshore N/A 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8
-Offshore N/A 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1
-Total 1.8 1.8 0 2.0 2.0 1.9
Malaysia-Brunei-Onshore N/A 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
-Offshore N/A 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
-Total 0.5 0.3 -40 0.2 0.2 0.2
Rest of Far East
& Oceania 9 0.3 0.0 -100 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Far East and Oceania
1I_I_III _II__IILI--·-LIIIIIC---1LYUIII
2. 5 -17 2.6 2.5 2.33.0
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TABLE 9 (Continued)
Crude Oil (plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts* by
Average low Rate Method (AFR)
(mbd)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
COUNTRY Actual** Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
% 
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Argentina 0.5 0.3 -40 0.3 0.3 0.3
Brazil-Onshore N/A 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
-Offshore N/A 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
-Total 0.2 0.1 -50 0.1 0.2 0.2
Mexico-Reforma10 N/A 1.0 1.6 4.0 3.8
-Other1 0 N/A 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2
-Total 1.3 1.4 8 2.0 4.3 4.0
Venezuela-Onshore N/A 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7
-Offshore N/A 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.2
-Total 2.6 2.1 -19 1.7 1.1 0.9
Rest of South andl
Central America 0.4 0.8 100 1.0 1.4 1.5
Total South & Central 5.0 4.7 -6 5.1 7.3 6.9
America
NORTH AMERICA
Canada 1.6 1.7 6 1.7 1.9 2.1
U.S.A.-excluding Alaska N/A 8.0 7.1 5.7 5.2
-Alaska N/A 2.2 1.9 1.3 0.9
-Total 10.3 10.2 -1 9.0 7.0 6.1
Total North America 11.9 11.9 0 10.7 8.9 8.2
60.7 62.8 3
· 
64.9 64.3 59.6TOTAL WORLD
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TABLE 10
Crude Oil (plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts by
Weighted Average Flow Rate Method (WAFR)
(mbd)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
COUNTRY Actual** Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
AFRICA
Algeria 1.2 1.6 33 1.7 1.3 0.9
Egypt 0.5 0.4 -20 0.4 0.5 0.5
Libya 2.5 2.9 16 3.1 3.3 3.0
Nigeria-Onshore N/A 3.5 3.9 3.5 2.4
-Offshore N/A 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
-Total 2.5 4.1 64 4.4 3.9 2.8
Rest of North Africa 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Rest of Central
& South Africa5 0.5 2.2 340 2.6 2.3 1.8
Total Africa 7.3 11.3 55 12.3 11.3 9.0
MIDDLE EAST
Bahrain 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Iran-Onshore N/A 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.7
-Offshore N/A 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5
-Total 7.0 7.2 3 7.2 7.2 7.2
Iraq 3.4 4.2 24 4.8 5.1 4.3
Kuwait 2.9 2.8 -3 2.4 1.5 1.0
Neutral Zone-Onshore N/A 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
-Offshore N/A 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
-Total 0.7 0.5 -29 0.6 0.5 0.5
Saudi Arabia-Onshore N/A 12.5 13.4 12.8 11.2
-Offshore N/A 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.8
-Total 12.5 14.6 17 15.6 15.4 14.0
U.A.E.-Onshore N/A 3.3 3.0 1.8 1.1
-Offshore N/A 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.6
-Total 3.2 4.1 28 3.9 3.1 2.7
Total Middle East 29.8 33.5 12 34.6 32.8 29.7
The forecast was made for each year for the period 1976 to 1990. It assumes a 5%
annual increase in development rig years for each country, beginning in 1976.
Figures are rounded to the nearest one hundred thousand barrels per day.
**
CIA "Installed" capacity is used for OPEC countries. Net exports to the non-communist
world are shown for China and the U.S.S.R. and the "Actual" numbers are for 1977
rather than 1978.
Note: Numbered Footnotes are in Appendix I.
-- - --- ~ ~ 
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TABLE 10 (Continued)
Crude Oil (plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts* by
Average Flow Rate Method (AFR)
(mbd)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
COUNTRY Actual ** Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
EUROPE
Norway 0.4 0.3 -25 0.5 1.1 1.6
U.K. 6 1.1 0.2 -82 0.4 0.9 1.2
Rest of Europe 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total Europe 1.8 0.8 -56 1.2 2.3 3.1
ASIA
China-Onshore77 N/A O.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
-Offshore N/A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-Total 0.2 0.1 -50 0.0 0.0 0.0
U.S.S.R. 1.4 1.4 0 2.0 1.0 0.0
Rest of Asia8 0.3 0.4 33 0.4 0.5 0.5
Total Asia 1.9 1.9 0 2.4 1 5 0.5
FAR EAST AND OCEANIA
Australia-Onshore N/A 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
rOffshore N/A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
-Total 0.4 0.4 0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Indonesia-Onshore N/A 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.3
-Offshore N/A 0.3 56 0.4 0.2 0.2
-Total 1.8 2.8 3.3 3.2 2.5
Malaysia-Brunei-Onshore N/A o.o 0.0 o.o 0.0
-Offshore N/A 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
-Total 0.5 0.2 -60 0.2 0.2 0.2
Rest of Far East
& OceaniaY 0.3 0.0 -100 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Far East and Oceania 3.0 3.4 13 3.8 3.7 3.0
41
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TABLE 10 (Continued)
(plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts* by
Average Flow Rate Method (AFR)
(mbd)
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 - 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
COUNTRY Actual** Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Argentina
Brazil-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total 10
Mexico-Reforma
-Otherl 
-Total
Venezuel a-Onshore
-Offshore
-Total
Rest of South and
Cntral America
Total South & Central
America
NORTH AMERICA
Canada
U.S.A.-excluding Alaska
-Alaska
-Total
Total North America
TOTAL WORLD
0.5
N/A
N/A
0.2
N/A
N/A
1.3
N/A
N/A
2.6
0.4
5.0
1.6
N/A
N/A
10.3
11.9
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.2
1.0
0.4
1.4
0.8
1.5
2.3
2.5
6.7
2.9
8.0
2.2
10.2
13.1
60.7 70.7
-40
0
8
-12
525
34
81
-1
10
16
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.2
1.6
0.4
2.0
0.9
1.1
2.0
2.8
7.3
3.8
7.1
1.9
9.0
12.8
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.3
4.0
0.3
4.3
1 .0
0.6
1.6
2.1
8.6
4.9
5.7
1.3
7.0
11.9
74.4 72.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.2
3.8
0.2
4.0
1.1
0.3
1.4
1.4
7.3
5.1
5.2
0.9
6.1
11.2
63.8
_ 
_
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TABLE 11
Summarized Crude Oil (plus NGL) Productive Capacity Forecasts*
by Average Flow Rate Method from'TABLE 9
(mbd)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1978 1978 1978 1980 1985 1990
AREA Actual,** Forecast Percentage Forecast Forecast Forecast
Difference
[(3)-(2)]/(2)
Saudi Arabia 1 12.5 14.3 14 15.3 15.3 13.9
Other Persian Gulf 6.1 6.2 2 5.9 4.7 3.7
Total Persian Gulf 18.6 20.5 10 21.2 20.0 17.6
Other OPEC 21.8 24.2 11 25.7 24.9 22.2
Total OPEC 40.4 44.7 11 46.9 44.9 39.8
U.S.A. 10.3 10.2 -1 9.0 7.0 6.1
Rest of World 10.0 11.6 16 14.3 17.0 17.8
Total World 60.7 66.5 10 70.2 68.9 63.7
Persian Gulf as a 46% 46% 45% 45% 44%% of Total OPEC
Persian Gulf as a 31% 30% 29% 28%
% of Total World
The forecast was made for each year for the period 1976 to 1990. It assumes a ..
5% annual increase in development rig years for each country, beginning in 1976.
Figures are rounded to the nearest one hundred thousand barrels per day.
**
CIA "Installed" capacity is used for OPEC countries. Net exports to the non-communist
world are shown for China and the U.S.S.R. and the "Actual" numbers are for
1977 rather than 1978.
Kuwait, UAE, Oman.
2Excludes OPEC and USA; includes Communist net exports.
I
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4. Areas for Further Research
We still have some refinement to do in our databank. However, we
generally have compiled the best data, cleansed of most inconsistencies,
that are available from publicly available sources. Data massaging, at
this level, will now have only marginal effects on our simulation
results. Only a deeper source level, such as company data, might have
significant impact; for example, in giving us a more realistic forecast
of rig-years.
Another fruitful area of development is within the model structure.
In particular, the following characteristics are important determinants
of our current results.
4.1 Reserves Added. We have not explicitly used the increment to
reserves (proved or probable). Yet this increment is the output of
drilling effort, a forecast of the cumulative additional flow.
Unfortunately, outside the U.S., total reserve data are weak and
insufficiently explained, so that first differences are often little
better than random noise. At best, we can treat the reserve increments,
over a period of several years, as a check on the flow-rate capacity
additions.
The aggregated model is basically an inertial model of production
from existing reserves. Exploration is considered only insofar as its
results are incorporated in the estimate of Ult R which we use. Whether
we can ascertain those methods of incorporation or acquire companies'
reestimations of Ult R is an open question.
We will capture the results in the higher proved reserve estimates
for known fields. There is no apparent way to relate the process to
price, except to indicate upper limits, i.e., given prices, costs, and
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reserves, a* ought not to exceed some value. In some countries outside
the cartel core this may be useful, but not necessarily even here. There
is, for example, no rational way of "explaining" the increase in Mexico's
proved, probable, or possible reserves by reference to price. The
Reforma discovery was worth making, and was made before the price
explosion. The higher prices made a faster development rational, but
this has been constrained by (a) reservoir control, (b) mobilization
time, and (c) national objectives which may at times run counter to
wealth maximizing.
The analysis of marginal cost and optimum depletion deals with the
"intensive margin," basically extensions, new reservoirs in old fields,
and improved recovery factors. Cost at the intensive margin is a proxy
for cost at the extensive margin, since the company always has the choice
between them.
4.2 Depletion Rate. The optimal depletion rate, a*, which approximates
optimal decline, tells us how to maximize NPV. But our model constrains
the annual depletion rate to the lesser of a* and the historical rate,
a. In most areas of the world, a* far exceeds historical a, even
allowing for great inaccuracy in our cost estimates. In general, given
1977 prices, a* is insensitive to capital coefficients below $6000 per
daily barrel, and most of the world is below that. We need to consider
whether mobilization (in a new area) or rate-sensitivity (in an old
province) has so increased the marginal cost that it can explain the
discrepancy, or whether there is some deliberate restriction at work.
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APPENDIX I
Numbered Footnotes to Tables 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10
1. Cumulative Production. This is the total amount of crude oil ever
produced from an area up to December 31, 1975. Our sources for these
data are IPE, OGJ, and various oil companies.
2. Proved Reserves. We would like this estimate to correspond as
closely as possible to the API definition.12 Our estimates are made by
dividing IPE reserves of identified largest fields by the portion of
total country current production accounted for by those fields. In
Libya, the portion used was of cumulative, not current, production. When
our estimate exceeded OGJ "proved reserves," we used the latter instead.
This was true for the following: Neutral Zone; Rest of Europe; Rest of
Asia; Rest of Central and South America; Rest of Central and South
Africa; and Algeria (where the two biggest fields' reserves are obviously
grossly overstated).
For Canada we used the "proved reserve" estimate of the Canadian
Petroleum Association. For the U.S.A. we used the API.
3. Ultimate Recoverable Reserves. This includes (a) cumulative
production (column 1), plus (b) proved reserves (column (2)), plus (c)
probable additions (extensions and revisions) in known fields, plus (d)
expected discoveries. Obviously (c) and particularly (d) are essentially
subjective interpretations of often fragmentary objective data. A
separate "proved-plus-probable" estimate is well worth the effort, and is
often made; but other estimates omit them, except for large areas.
The concept of (c) is rarely explained. Ours is: (1) the amount
recoverable with currently known technology, which may not yet be in
commercial use (e.g., offshore tension-leg drilling platforms and
undersea completion), but which will eventually be used, at current
(1977) prices. We wish also to include: (2) oil recoverable with
advanced ("tertiary") methods, which, when perfected, may require prices
up to, but not exceeding, $25 per barrel in 1976 prices. This concept is
basically that of the National Petroleum Council as published in their
Enhanced Oil Recovery, December 1976.
The inconsistency may be accepted because the new offshore
techniques seem on the verge of application, and need only more
development and experience. The onshore tertiary recovery picture is
currently so unsettled that a very high price must be assumed to make
new, untried techniques worthwhile. We hope to achieve a single standard
of comparison in time, and would welcome suggestions to that end.
Perhaps, for example, we should set a $25 ceiling offshore, as well as on.
The estimates of "probable" and "to-be-discovered" presented here
are from various oil companies, reconciled largely but not completely
with the report by John Moody and R.W. Esser ("An Estimate of the World's
Recoverable Crude Oil Resources," paper delivered to World Petroleum
Congress, Tokyo, 1975).
In cases where we had to split an estimate of a country's total
ultimate into onshore and offshore, we apportioned that total based on
the ratio of offshore to onshore fields' reserves as reported in IPE's
identified largest fields.
-- ----- --
^-- "~~`- ---
59
For the U.S.S.R. our source is: Arthur A. Meyerhoff, "Geopolitical
Implications of Russian and Chinese Petroleum," in Exploration and
Economics of the Petroleum Industry, Volume II; edited by Virgfnia S.
Cameron; MaFthewender-6 o.t , nc., New York, pp. 79-127, (1977), and as
modified in subsequent discussions.
4. Includes: Morocco and Tunisia.
5. Includes: Angola-Cabinda, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Somalia,
South Africa, South West Africa, and Zaire.
6. Includes: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, West Germany, and Yugoslavia.
7. All our data for the People's Republic of China comes from "Petroleum
Geology and Industry of the People's Republic of China" by A.A. Meyerhoff
and J.O. Willums, unpublished manuscript, 1976. In their paper "proved"
includes "probable."
8. Includes: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria
and Turkey.
9. Includes: Antarctica, Burma, Japan, New Zealand, Phillipines,
Taiwan, and Thailand.
10. Mexico has had a rapid pace of exploration, and extensive
reappraisal of its reserves during 1975 and 1976. For the sake of
consistency with the rest of the table we have used end-1976 reserves,
from Pemex annual Memoria de Labores, Table I-5. Note that more recent
data were used for the sTimuiation of Table 6.
11. Includes: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and
Trinidad-Tobago.
12. Source is: Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural
Gas in the United States and Canada, various years, published joint-b-by
Fme&rican-as ssociation, American Petroleum Institute, and Canadian
Petroleum Association.
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APPENDIX II
Explanation of Calculation of a* from Wade-Hanle[ Paper [11]
Method III at page 113 gives alternative development capital cost to
produce 100,00Dbd (= 35 million barrels per year) as 538 and 723
million. (The other methods are for different production rates, where
data are lacking.) To this we add capital equivalent of operating
costs. The economic limit to production is stated at 200 bd/w. On the
authors' assumptions of price of 12, 40 wells and 96 percent capacity
operation, this is $2400 daily per well, and 35 million per year. Since
the life of the project is 18.3 years, the present value of 34 million
per year is equal (in millions) to 34 (1 - e18 3r)/r. For the three
alternative values of r of 10, 15, and 20 percent, the three present
values are $282, $315, and $329. Each is paired with two alternative
capital costs to yield six variants. For example, let capital cost be
$538 million, and the discount rate be 10 percent. Then the present
value of operating costs is equal to $34 (1 - e- )83)/.10 = $282 million,
and:
1.2
a* 35 .10 = .126
Optimal depletion rates on varying assumptions
Discount rate Lower cost Higher cost
(percent)
10 12.6 10.4
15 12.7 10.0
20 9.2 6.4
The general or model plan assumed by Wade and Hanley has a peak
output of 35 mb per year, and 300 mb total reserves, or 11.7 percent.
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